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NicaraguaThis paper examines the capacities of smallholders in Nicaragua to exploit new linkages to certiﬁed coffee
markets following the coffee crisis. Data on livelihood assets were collected from 292 households, which
were clustered to test how differences in outcomes (asset building) reﬂect variations in initial asset
endowments. The results suggest that most households built particular elements of their asset base
and increased their resilience to future shocks. However, households struggled to make effective use of
the gains for intensifying their livelihoods. Of the least-endowed households, few made investments in
the scale or productivity of coffee, and most continued to depend heavily on subsistence production
and seasonal off-farm income for survival. In conclusion, improved market access alone, even under rel-
atively favorable market conditions and with considerable external support, will have uncertain impacts
on rural poverty if the underlying constraints on household assets and investments are not addressed
concurrently.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Intensify, innovate, and specialize – this was the essential mes-
sage for governments and donors looking to address the devasta-
tions of the coffee crisis in Central America and other coffee
producing regions. Between 1999 and 2005 prices paid for green
coffee did not allow producers in Central America to cover their
variable costs of production (IADB, 2002). Most smallholders re-
duced investment in coffee productivity, while others abandoned
coffee plantations altogether, or uprooted plantations in favor of
basic grains and other crops (Castro et al., 2004). Inﬂuential publi-
cations argued that smallholders had limited opportunities to in-
crease their share of the beneﬁts from trade in commodity coffee
markets, given that the overwhelming proportion of economic re-
turns ﬂowed to actors in developed countries (Oxfam, 2001; Ponte,
2002; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).
Consensus emerged that support for building smallholders’
links to specialty coffee markets, including those for certiﬁed
fair-trade and organic coffee, would improve the prospects for
smallholders in the short and long term (USAID, 2003; Varangis
et al., 2003; IICA, 2004; Bacon, 2005; Kilian et al., 2005). Thespecialty market exhibited rapid demand growth, in contrast to
slow growth for bulk coffees. Access to these markets required that
smallholders meet stricter quality requirements and, in some
cases, obtain access to certiﬁcation. Subsequent development
interventions aimed to improve coffee quality and productivity,
facilitate access to certiﬁcation, strengthen collective enterprises
in regions where the production of high-quality coffee was most
viable, and promote diversiﬁcation out of coffee for regions with
less potential.
Recently, however, various studies have tempered expecta-
tions regarding the poverty-reducing potential of access to mar-
kets for fair-trade and organic coffee. Arguments have centered
on the persistence of low yields and relatively high labor require-
ments (Valkila, 2009; Barham et al., 2011; Beuchelt and Zeller,
2011), declining prices relative to conventional coffee (Weber,
2011), and the limits of smallholders to intensify coffee systems
given their livelihood insecurities and rising production and
household consumption costs (Raynolds, 2002; Bacon et al.,
2008; Mendez et al., 2010; Wilson, 2010). These ﬁndings on cof-
fee echo those of well-documented studies in the Mediterranean,
Africa and Latin America on the struggles of smallholders to meet
stricter buyer demands for product quality, volume, and timeli-
ness of delivery across a range of agrifood sectors (e.g., Reinhardt,
1987; Dolan et al., 1999; Reardon et al., 2003; Garcia Martinez
and Poole, 2004).
While NGOs, donors, and development agencies have main-
tained their enthusiasm for facilitating smallholder links to high-
er-value markets (Devaney, 2011), few value chain studies or
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mented the impact of improved market access on poverty, gender,
or the environment (Bolwig et al., 2010; Stoian et al., 2012). Project
assessments generally have relied on only a few generic impact
indicators (e.g., output per acre, size of holding, and income
gained) and thus have provided limited understanding of the
determinants of household participation and the beneﬁts across
different types of households (e.g., Zandniapour et al., 2004;
Humphrey and Navas-Alemán, 2010). As a result, policy makers
and development practitioners have inadequate guidance for the
design of the necessarily complex interventions that seek to help
farmers beneﬁt more from their linkages with higher-value
markets.
Deeper insights into how smallholders beneﬁt from linkages to
higher-value markets can be obtained by adopting a livelihoods
perspective, with special emphasis on households’ assets and the
ability of households to build their endowments over time. In this
paper, we undertake an analysis of household asset building in
order to explore how differences in market participation reﬂect
variations in households’ endowments of livelihood assets, namely
natural, human, social, physical, and ﬁnancial capitals. We
consider:
 initial asset endowments of producing households,
 the contribution of development interventions to house-
hold asset building,
 how initial asset endowments and subsequent household
changes determine smallholders’ participation in high-
value export markets.
Section ‘An asset building framework’ describes the asset-build-
ing framework. Section ‘Case study background’ provides contex-
tual information on the case study in Nicaragua. Section ‘Study
design and methods’ discusses the methods used for data collec-
tion. Section ‘Changes in assets of coffee producing households’
presents the results on asset changes by coffee-producing house-
holds. In the ﬁnal section, we discuss the implications of the ﬁnd-
ings for the design of development interventions aimed at linking
smallholders to higher-value food markets.
An asset building framework
Poverty debates reﬂect a growing interest in the importance of
assets for understanding poor people’s ability to respond to short-
ages and shocks and generate future income and consumption
(e.g., Moser, 1998; Rakodi, 1999; Anderson, 2012). Economists
have argued that a focus on assets provides a better option for
understanding the underlying causes and the dynamics of poverty
than a focus on income or consumption variables alone (e.g.,
Birdsall and Londono, 1997; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). Carter
and Barrett’s (2006) theoretical work on asset thresholds and
poverty traps drew attention to how insufﬁcient access to assets
jeopardizes the long-term ability of households to pull them-
selves out of poverty. An understanding of asset endowments
and interactions forms a core element of the frameworks for
livelihood conceptualization and analysis (e.g., Ellis, 2000;
Carney, 1998).
Academic discourse on the links between poverty reduction and
access to higher-value markets suggests that the poorest small-
holders often have too few assets to effectively participate over
time. However, such insights into the roles of assets in shaping
rural livelihoods have yet to translate into the design and assess-
ment of interventions for linking smallholders to higher-value
markets (Stoian et al., 2012). For example, the various methodolo-
gies for designing strategies that better link smallholders to
markets pay little attention to households’ capacities, needs, andcircumstances, thus making the implicit assumptions that (1)
households have sufﬁcient assets to effectively participate in high-
er value markets, (2) do not face substantial trade-offs when using
these assets, and (3) are able to assume higher risks for their
investments (Donovan et al., 2013). Making such assumptions re-
duces the complexity for methodological implementation but runs
the risk of formulating intervention strategies that provide limited
long-term beneﬁt to the rural poor.
More effective policies, programmes and projects for linking
smallholders to globalizing food markets will require that key as-
pects of the development challenge be addressed in formal tools
and frameworks. The framework presented here stresses the rela-
tionships between a household’s endowment of livelihood assets
and its ability to engage in various livelihood activities (Fig. 1).
Livelihood assets, namely natural, physical, social, ﬁnancial, and
human capitals, may be individual or collectively owned. These
are built up through returns from market activities, remittances
and inheritances, and inputs and services provided by NGOs and
other external actors. Variations in asset accumulation may be
explained, in part, by variations in the overall political, legal, and
institutional context that shapes the decisions of producers and
buyers. The stronger a household’s asset base, the greater is its
ability to expand and intensify livelihood activities and thus bene-
ﬁt from links with more demanding markets.
Households maintain different types of commercial relations
with buyers linked to local, national, and international food
markets. In addition, households may engage in seasonal and
year-round labor provision. Investments in household labor and
ﬁnancial resources and returns to those investments vary accord-
ing to the market and over time. To the extent that new (more
intensive) market linkages require new (increased) investments,
trade-offs are likely between assets and among activities required
to implement other livelihood activities, including subsistence
production. Opportunities to reduce the costs and risks related
to market investments may originate from collective enterprises,
other buyers, and nonmarket actors (e.g., NGOs and government
agencies).
This framework suggests that the design of pro-poor interven-
tions in value chains must progress beyond the categorization of
the types of capital to identify priorities for policy and interven-
tions supporting asset building. Such prioritization should relate
poor peoples’ access to different types of assets to the functions
of those assets within changing and dynamic livelihood strategies,
identifying the most effective livelihood development paths and
the changing roles of different assets within those paths. The
framework and methodological approach used here enables a sys-
tematic analysis of asset endowments and the varied livelihood
strategies of the poor. It will help policymakers assess whether ac-
cess to new or higher-value food markets will help households
climb out of poverty, and address questions such as: Which house-
holds are more able to build their asset bases? How are assets built
up over time? Which households are best able to invest in new or
more intensive market linkages?
Case study background
Among agricultural products exported by Nicaragua, coffee is
the most important, accounting for 37% of the total value of agri-
cultural exports in 2008 (CEPAL, 2009). Nicaragua’s average coffee
productivity, at 672 kg/ha (green coffee), makes it the least efﬁ-
cient producer in Central America, at roughly 50% of the productiv-
ity of Costa Rica and 40% of the productivity of Guatemala
(Varangis et al., 2003). There are about 48,000 coffee farmers in
Nicaragua, 80% of whom are producers with less than 3.5 ha under
cultivation (Flores et al., 2002). Despite the large number of
smallholders, farms larger than 3.5 ha produce more than 85% of
Fig. 1. Household asset allocations and linkages with markets and service providers.
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ment and better access to purchased inputs. In general, coffee pro-
ducers are better-off than the landless or those who produce basic
grains and tubers mainly for subsistence. That said, the poorest of
coffee farmers often lack resources for coffee production and basic
living expenses and are vulnerable to negative changes in output
and input prices, production risks and other shocks.
The research examined asset building by smallholders in north-
central Nicaraguawhowere linked to certiﬁed fair-trade and organ-
ic coffee markets through the cooperative Soppexcca. Soppexcca
has roughly 500 members. It emerged in 2001 from the ashes of
its predecessor cooperative, which dissolved due to unpaid debts
owed to international coffee buyers. Soppexcca’smembershipmore
than doubled during the coffee crisis, as smallholders sought credit
and higher coffee prices. In addition to providing access to certiﬁed
markets, Soppexcca offers annual credit for coffee production, mul-
tiyear credit for strategic coffee-related investments, technical
assistance for increasing coffee productivity and reducing environ-
mental impacts of coffee production, and some forms of social pro-
tection. In 2009, all of Soppexcca’s coffee exports were fair-trade
certiﬁed, and approximately 15% were certiﬁed for both fair trade
and organic. Since its beginnings, Soppexcca has maintained strong
ties with a small group of European coffee buyers. Recently, the
cooperative has forged ties with U.S. coffee buyers.
Soppexcca, like other relatively large and well established coop-
eratives in Nicaragua, maintains close links with NGOs and devel-
opment projects. Between 2003 and 2009, Soppexcca received
about US$2.1 million from NGOs and development projects to
build its infrastructure, strengthen its internal organization, and
expand its service offer to members. Soppexcca maintains links
to alternative lending institutions for access to low-cost credit for
infrastructure development and the purchase of coffee from its
members. In addition, Soppexcca receives support from coffee buy-
ers in the form of fair-trade contracts (with social premium and
ﬂoor prices) and zero-interest credit for purchase of coffee from
its members. On average, in 2009, buyers offered Soppexcca prices
that exceeded by 5–15% those established by fair-trade standards.
Study design and methods
Data collection focused on identifying changes in endowments
of livelihood assets among coffee-producing households afﬁliated
with Soppexcca during the four-year period between 2005–2006and 2008–2009. Quantitative and qualitative data were collected
to understand the changes in assets, and qualitative information
was used to understand the relevance of and the reasons for the
changes. Feasibility of empirical research and the tractability of
analysis required a focus on speciﬁc elements of the ﬁve livelihood
assets rather than undertake a comprehensive analysis of all asset
concepts. After exploratory and participatory research among pro-
ducers to validate asset concepts and methodology, the most
important asset changes were assessed using the following set of
indicators:
 Natural capital: access to land and area under coffee production,
land tenure arrangements, access to fertilizers (proxy for soil
fertility), and waste management.
 Human capital: management skills in coffee production, ability
to participate in cooperative governance.
 Social capital: linkages and reciprocity in relationships with cof-
fee buyers.
 Physical capital: capital for production and processing.
 Financial capital: access to credit, income beneﬁt from coffee
sales to Soppexcca.
In most cases, what we observed and measured provided a par-
tial understanding of the ﬁve assets and their relevance for liveli-
hood strategies. This is especially true in the case of social
capital, the concept of which admittedly has been much contested
(e.g., Fine, 1999). In research on smallholders, social capital has
been explored in various ways, including interactions with neigh-
bors (e.g., Elder et al., 2012) and links with farmer organizations
(e.g., Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). In this study, the assessment
of social capital focuses on relations between Soppexcca members,
the cooperative itself, and transactions with other coffee buyers,
with special attention to the formation of mutually beneﬁcial
trading relationships. The data collected focused on the services
and inputs received by smallholders from buyers, and, in the case
of Soppexcca, the ability of the cooperative to service, and source
raw material from, its members.
Environmental sustainability issues were addressed under the
management of natural asset – soil fertility – and human
asset – waste management practices. Commercial sustainability
was subsumed within concepts of social and ﬁnancial capital.
Equity issues, such as differential impacts and outcomes for house-
holds, were addressed through the clustering approach.
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other major income sources, on contextual factors that could have
facilitated or hindered asset building, and members’ insights into
the reasons why a given change did or did not take place.
The sample included 292 coffee-producing households – about
95% of the membership of 11 of Soppexcca’s 18 base cooperatives.
Criteria for base cooperative selection included distance from Sop-
pexcca’s headquarters and geographical concentration of members
in a given base cooperative. To facilitate data collection, preference
was given to those cooperatives with a higher concentration of
households. Unless otherwise indicated, coffee quantities are pre-
sented as pre-dried parchment coffee – the semi-processed state
of coffee when it is sold by producers to buyers such as Soppexcca.
One hundred pounds of export-ready (green) coffee is commonly
processed from roughly 200 lb of pre-dried parchment coffee pro-
duced by farmers in north-central Nicaragua.
Data collection was conducted in Jinotega and Matagalpa dis-
tricts during a nine-month period in 2009–2010. Primary data
from household surveys and key informant interviews were sup-
plemented by secondary information from Soppexcca staff. Twenty
key informant interviews were conducted with Soppexcca leaders,
international coffee buyers, certiﬁcation agents, and other chain
actors. Recall information was used to identify current asset
endowments and changes in asset endowments over the assess-
ment period.
Cluster analysis allowed for understanding the potential for as-
set building by different types of households. Clusters were formu-
lated using a two-step clustering technique using SPSS. Two
variables with strong correlation that formed the basis for forma-
tion of the clusters were (1) area under coffee production in
2008–2009 and (2) percentage of total household income derived
from off-farm sources in 2008. A three-cluster solution emerged
from this analysis, with household livelihoods descriptors and
cluster characterization as follows:
 Small-scale diversiﬁed livelihoods (SDL) (n = 77): relatively small
area under coffee production; high dependence on income
derived from off-farm labor activities (often as wage labor for
other, usually larger farmers); some contribution from other
crops.
 Small-scale specialized livelihoods (SSL) (n = 162): relatively small
area under coffee production; majority of income derived on-
farm from coffee, with contributions from banana, citrus, beans
and other products.
 Large-scale specialized livelihoods (LSL) (n = 53): relatively large
area under coffee production; majority of income derived from
coffee, with contributions from livestock, banana, citrus and
other products.Table 1
ANOVA results comparing selected indicators across clusters.
Cluster
Small-sca
livelihood
Total income 2008 (US$) 2617
F(2,292) = 80.98, p < .05 (±2557)
Income from sale of coffee 2008 (US$) 867
F (2,292) = 50.73, p < .05 (±1033)
Income from off-farm sources 2008 (US$) 1618
F(2,292) = 61.79, p < .05 (±1651)
Area under coffee production (ha) 2008–2009 F (2,290) = 96.98, p < .05 1.5
(±0.4)
Highest education achieve Soppexcca-registered household member
(highest grade achieved) F (2,290) = 0.34, p > .10
3.6
(±3.8)
Age of household head registered with Soppexcca F (2,290) = 2.84, p < .10 44.1 (±12Table 1 provides insights into the differences between the clus-
ters. The mean total annual income for the sample was US$4969
(or, given an average household size of 5.2, US$956 per capita).
Pushing up the average was total income for LSL households, which
at US$14,627 was several-fold higher than that of other house-
holds. For both LSL and SSL households, coffee contributed be-
tween 85% and 93% of total income. For SDL households, coffee
contributed approximately 33% of total income, with 5% coming
from other farming activities and 62% from off-farm. In most cases,
these households depended on short-term, low-skill jobs in the
agricultural sector. Across all the clusters, cash income derived
from agricultural sources other than coffee was generally a small
share of total income. The ANOVA results suggest that the cluster
solution was robust and thus provided a solid basis for analysis
of changes in livelihood assets.Changes in assets of coffee producing households
Natural capital
Access to land and area under coffee production
The expansion of landholdings and the area under coffee pro-
duction provide important indicators of natural capital manage-
ment and the overall ability of smallholders to improve their
well-being through access to speciality coffee markets. For both
indicators, results suggest a notable improvement in natural capi-
tal for a broad section of the sample. Eighty households, or nearly
one-third of the sample, expanded their landholdings. The average
landholding increased from 4.6 ha to 5.1 ha (Fig. 2). Among the
clusters, the largest percentage increase in landholdings, at
15.4%, was recorded by households from the SDL cluster. House-
holds from the SSL cluster increased their landholdings, on aver-
age, by 11.8%, while, on average, households from the LSL cluster
experienced limited change in landholdings.
Many households also increased their area under coffee produc-
tion through new land purchases or the conversion of existing land
to coffee production. Roughly half the sample, or 158 households,
expanded coffee production. The average area increased from
1.9 ha to 2.5 ha (Fig. 3). Households from the LSL cluster increased
area under coffee, on average, by 1.4 ha (28% increase over the pre-
existing area). Households from the SSL cluster increased area un-
der coffee, on average, by 0.4 ha (31% increase over the pre-existing
area), while households from the SDL increased their area under
coffee by an average of 0.29 ha (26% increase over the pre-existing
area).
Expansion of landholdings and area under coffee represent
considerable investments over multiple years. Households oftenTotal (SD)
le diversiﬁed
s (SDL) (SD)
Small-scale specialized
livelihoods (SSL) (SD)
Large-scale specialized
livelihoods (LSL) (SD)
2927 14,627 (±13,221) 4969 (±7605)
(±2730)
2486 13,474 4053
(±1828) (±8579) (±4543)
157 304 569
(±466) (±757) (±1154)
1.8 6.3 2.5
(±1.5) (±6.8) (±2.9)
3.0 3.3 3.2
(±2.2) (±2.5) (±2.7)
.2) 42.0 (±13.3) 48.6 (±10.7) 43.3 (±12.6)
Fig. 2. Change in total land area (ha), by cluster, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009.
Fig. 3. Change in area (ha) under coffee production, by cluster, 2004–2005 to 2008–
2009.
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including access to credit with extended repayment periods, in-
come coffee sales, and from other sources, including income gener-
ated off-farm. Soppexcca was the only source of multiyear credit
identiﬁed by sampled households. Fifty-six per cent of the sample
received three-year credit for land purchases and renovation of
coffee plantations (for details, see the ﬁnancial capital section). Lo-
gistic regression showed the relative importance of credit, off-farm
income, and pre-existing land size in predicting the expansion of
coffee production. The strongest predictor of coffee expansion
was access to multiyear credit. For each US$500 installment of
credit obtained, households increased their odds of expanding
their area under coffee production by nearly ﬁve times (Table 2).
Land-tenure arrangements
Land-tenure insecurity is a legacy of the agrarian reform, which
left many potential coffee farmers in ambiguous legal positions
regarding land ownership, vulnerable to appropriation of land ti-
tles by banks. This situation has long challenged rural developmentTable 2
Multiple logistic regression showing effects of credit, off-farm income generation, and pre
(N = 292)a
Pre-existing land holding (2004–2005)
% Income generated off-farm
Age of Soppexcca member
Total credit received between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 (US$500 units)
N household members
Constant
a The model as a whole correctly classiﬁed 77.2% of all cases.in Nicaragua (Broegaard, 2005; Fraser et al., 2013). For some
Soppexcca-afﬁliated households, uncertain tenure arrangements
prior to joining the cooperative severely restricted investments in
farm production. These households belonged to two Soppexcca-
afﬁliated base cooperatives, which, when combined, formed
roughly one-third of the SDL cluster. For members of one of these
two base cooperatives, Julio Hernández, considerable progress was
achieved in building natural capital and other assets during the
period. However, for members of the base cooperative El Esfuerzo,
insecure tenure persisted and would likely constrain their
investments in coffee for the distant future.
The cooperative Julio Hernández illustrates key points in asset
management and building. Prior to 2001, the members lived and
worked on a state-owned coffee enterprise. In 2001, a collective ti-
tle was obtained for the plantation, and soon after, individual plots
were distributed among the former plantation workers. With indi-
vidual plots came the urgent need for members to build skills in
coffee production, renovate coffee plantations, and link with coffee
buyers. Soppexcca facilitated the organization of the base cooper-
ative and provided technical assistance and credit for coffee reno-
vation. Productivity levels for Julio Hernández members increased
signiﬁcantly during the period, from a two-year average of 314 kg/
ha in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006 to 503 kg/ha in 2008–2009 and
2007–2008. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the advances in
productivity were linked to services provided by Soppexcca: pre-
existing assets among members were relatively low and no other
provider of technical assistance or credit was identiﬁed during
the period. Moreover, Julio Hernández members emphasized the
role of Soppexcca in building their natural and ﬁnancial capitals
during interviews.
However, the case of El Esfuerzo illustrates the vulnerability of
households where members had yet to overcome power abuse and
conﬂict related to land tenure. During the 1990s, the households
that would form El Esfuerzo farmed collectively titled land and
sold their coffee through a collective enterprise. The coffee was
sold to an exporter who provided credit in exchange for a set
amount of green coffee. In 1999, the exporter failed to provide
credit, and households struggled to collect sufﬁcient coffee to meet
their delivery quota. In response, the exporter took possession of
their land. The households retained a lawyer and fought the case
for nine years before achieving success. Currently, the lawyer holds
the collective land title and will release it to the households when
she is paid the US$80,000 owed for her services. By 2009, El Esfuer-
zo members continued to rank among the least productive coffee
farmers and were among the least able to sustain their livelihoods
through on-farm production.Access to fertilizers (proxy for soil fertility)
Coffee production mines nutrients from the soil, which, if not
replaced through organic or inorganic fertilizers, results in gradu-
ally declining productivity (Van der Vossen, 2005). Thus, use of fer-
tilizers and maintenance of soil fertility are key indicators of
resource management and sustainability. Evidence from long-term-existing land ownership on coffee expansion.
B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio
.065 .025 .010 .937
1.230 .525 .019 .292
.028 .013 .030 .972
1.589 .282 .000 4.897
.038 .065 .561 .963
1.532 .572 .007 4.627
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conventional coffee production can reach productivity levels of
1487 kg/ha and 1927 kg/ha, respectively, with ‘moderate’ levels
of fertilization (Haggar et al., 2011). However, the average produc-
tivity for the sampled organic and conventional producers, at
726 kg/ha and 1278 kg/ha, fell far below these estimates. Among
households in the SDL cluster, results were more discouraging still,
at 552 kg/ha for organic producers and 582 kg/ha for conventional
producers. This suggests that lack of access to fertilizers remains a
barrier to building and maintaining natural capital.
All organic producers applied coffee pulp to their plantations as
a source of fertilizer. For some, it was the main fertilizer. However,
the coffee pulp available from a given farm likely provided only a
fraction of the soil nutrients lost through coffee production.1 For
some organic coffee producers, processed chicken manure, sold un-
der the brand name Biogreen, provided an important organic source
of nutrients. One 45 kg sack of Biogreen provides 1 kg of nitrogen.
However, between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, on average, only
36% of organic producers applied Biogreen to their coffee planta-
tions. Moreover, among these households, few were able to purchase
enough Biogreen to achieve reasonable productivity levels.2 The
mean number of bags/ha of Biogreen applied ranged from a high
of 21.9 in 2006–2007 to a low of 16.7 in 2008–2009. In general, these
results suggest that soil nutrient requirements for organic coffee
production are not being met, and therefore natural assets are being
depleted.
Among households that produced conventional coffee, the
relatively high cost of inorganic fertilizer (Ganes-Chase, 2009)
presented a challenge to replenishing soil nutrients lost to coffee
production for cash-strapped producers. Data on inorganic fertil-
izer utilization (‘complete’ and urea) were collected from 152
households between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009. Twenty-two
households, or 14% of those sampled, reported no purchase of
inorganic fertilizer during the entire period. For any one year, the
percentage of households that reported inorganic fertilizer usage
varied from a high of 79% in 2008–2009 to a low of 61% in 2006–
2007. Evidence suggested that overall fertilizer usage by house-
holds in the SDL and SSL clusters was on the rise. The number of
SDL households that applied at least one bag of complete fertilizer
increased from 21% in 2006–2007 to 42% in 2008–2009. Similarly,
75% of SSL households applied at least one bag of ‘complete’ in
2008–2009, compared to only 53% in 2006–2007. No major change
was reported in fertilizer use for LSL households. On average, 92%
of LSL households applied ‘complete’ fertilizer between 2006–
2007 and 2008–2009. Despite the overall increase in fertilizer
application, however, households in the SDL cluster generally did
not reach the estimated nitrogen threshold (39 kg of nitrogen/ha)
for achieving reasonable productivity levels. Most households
identiﬁed annual credit from Soppexcca and other coffee buyers
as the main contributing factor to increased fertilizer purchases.
Human capital
Management skills in coffee production
One important element of human capital for coffee growers is
the knowledge, skills and capacity to manage plantations sustain-
ably and produce uniform, high quality beans. In general, small-
holders in Nicaragua do not practice regular pruning or other1 To achieve reasonable yields from organic coffee production in Nicaragua, Haggar
et al. (2011) reported the use of nearly 9 tons of coffee pulp per ha/year. This is
roughly two to three times as much pulp as just returning the pulp from the coffee
produced.
2 To keep coffee yields at a reasonable level and to maintain soil fertility, a
minimum of 36 kg of nitrogen/ha need to be supplied annually (Valkila, 2009). This
assumes that producers recycle their coffee pulp and use nitrogen-ﬁxing shade trees –
both of which are common practices among smallholders in Nicaragua.forms of improved crop management on their coffee plantations
(Rice, 1999). This, combined with knowledge that several of Sop-
pexcca’s base cooperatives had only recently gained land titles
and thus the opportunity to invest in their coffee production, sug-
gests that overall human capital endowments in this context were
low prior to the period. Before joining Soppexcca, most inter-
viewed households reported not having access to technical assis-
tance for coffee production. Technical assistance and training by
Soppexcca in shade management and pruning techniques aimed
to support their members to sustain coffee yields, while at the
same time enhancing natural capital (e.g., reduced contamination,
protection from erosion, and enhanced nutrient recycling).
Results among the sample were mixed. On one hand, most
households acquired new skills for reducing contamination from
coffee milling and providing higher-quality coffee. Fifty-four per
cent of the households reported the application of selective har-
vesting (of mature beans) during the period. Most of these house-
holds were from the SSL cluster (n = 31) and the LSL cluster
(n = 12). Six households from the SDL cluster reported the imple-
mentation of selective harvesting. Similarly, 66% of the households
disposed of wastewater in inﬁltration pits in 2008–2009 (com-
pared to only 11% of the sample three years prior). SSL households
were the most likely to have adapted the new techniques for
wastewater treatment (74%), followed by LSL households (70%)
and SDL households (58%).
The overall low coffee productivity suggests that improper
plantation management may continue to be a genuine concern.
While it was not possible to observe or measure plantation man-
agement practices for this study, insights were gained on the
effectiveness of technical assistance through interviews with
technical assistance staff and from Soppexcca members. The
evidence suggests that Soppexcca’s technical assistance program
struggled to provide the coverage and quality of services needed
for upgrading the production skills of poor coffee farmers.
According to one key informant, efforts to encourage more inten-
sive plantation management have been ineffective, due in part to
(1) a reluctance by producers to trim or stump coffee trees that
are productive and (2) the inability of Soppexcca staff to work
intensively with producers to upgrade their crop management
skills (Pinedo, 2009). Soppexcca had yet to implement a monitor-
ing system for plantation management. Moreover, there was no
link between Soppexcca technical assistance and the credit
department.
Households reported their perceptions on the value of technical
assistance for coffee production between 2007–2008 and 2008–
2009. For most households, Soppexcca was the only provider of
training and on-site technical assistance. Forty-four per cent
(n = 129) reported being dissatisﬁed or highly dissatisﬁed with
technical assistance provision. Selected household responses shed
light on the nature of the problem:
 Household #26: ‘‘We were visited once in 2008, but the
extensionist didn’t provide technical advice; he arrived to
inform us of a meeting at the cooperative.’’
 Household #265: ‘‘I lack advice when I need it: on one occa-
sion, I requested a visit from the extensionist because the
coffee berries were falling off the branches, but he never
came.’’
 Household #187: ‘‘He only comes to estimate the harvest. I
am only able to consult with the extensionist during train-
ing events—that is how I have obtained technical
assistance.’’
 Household #277: ‘‘Visits are only for estimating the har-
vest—the extensionist does not know my coffee plantation.
He sends others from the community to assist me and does
not provide advice.’’
Table 3
Characteristics of trading relationships for coffee sold by Soppexcca members.
Buyer Two-year average farm gate
price (2007–2008 to 2008–
2009)
Payment conditions in 2008–2009 Services offered in addition to coffee marketing
in 2008–2009
Soppexcca Organic: US$136 Floor price (fair trade) Technical assistance
Conventional: US$109 Interest rate 1.2%/month Certiﬁcation
Initial payment with short term credit (20%), partial
payment upon delivery to warehouse (60%), ﬁnal
payment in June (20%)
Fertilizer for purchase (delivered to farm)
Short- and long-term credit (no collateral
required, interest rate between 1.2% and 1.3%/
month)
Emergency credit
Other servicesb
Market buyersa Conventional: US$97 Full payment upon delivery Purchase of coffee
Price to producer: direct exporter price, minus
commission
Exchange of basic food items for parchment
coffee (before and after harvest)
Short term credit (no interest on credit taken
prior to harvest; 5%/month interest on all other
credit)
Flexibility in credit repayment (paying coffee
debt with basic grains production)
Community-based buyers Conventional: US$97 Land title not required for credit Technical assistance
Full payment upon delivery, price based on New York
market price
Short-term credit (interest rate at 1.5–2%/
month)
Fertilizer for purchase (delivered to farm)
Transport of coffee to warehouse
Direct exporters Conventional: US$99 Contract required for credit (with collateral) Short-term credit (Interest rate 1.5–2%/month)
Final payment upon delivery, priced based on New York
market price
a Information based on results from 18 key informant interviews carried out on-site with buyers of coffee at the markets of Jinotega and Matagalpa in August 2009.
b For example, emergency transport to hospital, contributions to meeting funeral expenses, assessment with land tenure disputes.
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should use, but the extensionist did not indicate the doses
and I burned the plants.’’
Skills for cooperative governance
A share in ownership and governance by members is an
important cooperative principle and feature of human capital.
Findings showed that representation of members on the board
of directors was mostly tokenism. The main reasons were
insufﬁcient skills by the board and lack of information from
Soppexcca. The former president of the board noted that she re-
ceived no training in basic business or in cooperative manage-
ment prior to assuming her post as the board president.
During her period on the board she had limited understanding
of how Soppexcca formulated its prices for parchment coffee,
nor did she participate in setting the agenda for board meetings.
Other informants noted that the board and Oversight Committee
did not have access to timely ﬁnancial information, due mainly
to the absolute lack of the information, rather than inaccessibil-
ity of the information. Interviews highlighted the board’s reluc-
tance to question, debate, or probe Soppexcca’s executive
management in strategic decisions and investments. External
service providers remained distant on the empowerment of
Soppexcca’s members and engaged directly with Soppexcca’s
professional management.
Strong professional leadership, combined with a long-term
commitment from buyers and NGOs to its development and the
institutional framework provided by fair-trade certiﬁcation has
played an important role in building Soppexcca’s organizational as-
set base, but this has come through external investment rather
than organic human capital growth among the membership. Limi-
tations to build effective internal leadership within the cooperative
has resulted in a high concentration of power and information in
the professional manager, hence vulnerability of the organization
and all the value chain relationships.Social capital
From an individual or household perspective, the extent to
which linkages with coffee buyers generate tangible beneﬁts for
maintaining and improving livelihoods forms an important ele-
ment of social capital (Portes, 1998). Our discussion of social cap-
ital focuses on the supply-chain relationship beneﬁts derived
from collaboration with Soppexcca and the signiﬁcance of institu-
tional arrangements for reducing transaction costs.
In general, smallholders rarely have access to affordable credit in
Nicaragua (Bastiaensen, 2005). Prior to joining Soppexcca, most
households from the SDL and SSL clusters (69% and 67%, respec-
tively) sold their coffee exclusively to buyers in the towns of Jinot-
ega and Matagalpa. In contrast, only 36% of households from the
LSL employed intermediaries for marketing their coffee prior to
joining Soppexcca. Few households reported access to buyer-pro-
vided credit in the year prior to joining Soppexcca (20%) and even
fewer reported access to buyer-provided technical assistance (9%).
Households from the LSL cluster were more likely to have forged
linkages with direct exporters prior to their having joined Sop-
pexcca, and thus were more likely have access to credit and higher
prices.
Having forged new linkages with Soppexcca, most households
retained their previous relationships with pre-existing coffee buy-
ers. Buyers differed in terms of services offered and the transaction
costs of doing business (Table 3). Relative to other buyers, Sop-
pexcca was the most demanding in terms of quality but also of-
fered the most extensive range of services. In 2008–2009, credit
was available for most members without formal land titles or other
forms of collateral at an annual interest of 16% for annual credit
and 14% for multiyear credit. Soppexcca was the only buyer that
offered protection from future downturns in coffee prices through
the fair-trade ﬂoor price.
Soppexcca provided other valuable services. Beginning in 2007,
the cooperative employed a team of eight extensionists to provide
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for its members (vehicular transport for emergencies, donation of
a cofﬁn on the death of a member or member’s spouse, credit/
donations for medical expenses), and access to development
projects. However, doing business with Soppexcca was relatively
costly. Payment for coffee was made in three installments, with
ﬁnal installment (approximately 20% of the total price) being
delayed until May–June. All credit and payment transactions
required travel to Soppexcca’s ofﬁce in Jinotega and producers
assumed all risks for transport of coffee to the warehouse.
Compared to Soppexcca, transactions with market buyers of-
fered faster payment, with cash upon delivery of coffee and credit
on demand; however, producers had to trade off ease of sale and
timeliness of payment against generally slower business processes
and higher costs for credit.
Few sampled households sold to direct exporters of coffee
(n = 5). Exporters provided annual credit on a contract basis, with
land titles generally required as collateral unless producers had a
history of compliance with contractual obligations. Annual credit
during the 2008–2009 season was offered at a 17% annual interest
rate. Producers had the option to receive ﬁnal payment (market
price minus amount of annual credit) upon delivery of parchment
coffee. Additional services, such as on-site technical assistance and
pick-up of parchment coffee, were not reported.
Side-selling is a common but complex phenomenon affecting
cooperative operations and relationships with members. Data on
coffee sales by buyer indicated Soppexcca’s difﬁculty in increasing
its capture of raw material from its members. For organically cer-
tiﬁed households, the mean percentage of coffee sold to Soppexcca
between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 was 73%, while for conven-
tional producers, the mean percentage was 57% (Table 4). This sug-
gests that price was not the major factor behind selling to buyers
other than Soppexcca. Reponses presented below illustrate the
diversity of reasons. The most common response hinged on the
need to cover production expenses for the coffee harvest (n = 31).
In other cases, households identiﬁed emergencies and expenses
as the main reason for selling to other buyers (n = 8), poor quality
(n = 4), and restricted access to credit (n = 2). Below are quotes
from households in SDL cluster (emphasis added):
 Household #190: ‘‘Don Osman pays better than Soppexcca;
Soppexcca has too many price deductions, and he is less
concerned with quality.’’
 Household #24: ‘‘Because my brother needed money, I sold
coffee in the market to resolve his need.’’
 Household #188: ‘‘Due to delays in the provision of
credit—the intermediary is much quicker. Soppexcca
always delivers credit in June, while the intermediary
delivers in May.’’Table 4
Percentage of coffee sold to Soppexcca, by producer type and cluster.
Cluster Average % of production sold to Soppexcca from 2006–2007
to 2008–2009 (SD)
N
Conventionala
SDL 54.6 (±32.8) 50
SSL 59.5 (±30.9) 128
LSL 53.5 (±33.9) 43
Total 57.2 (±31.9) 221
Organic
SDL 70.1 (±33.3) 27
SSL 74.5 (±22.5) 32
LSL 77.0 (±30.0) 10
Total 73.2 (±27.8) 69
a Differences between the means for conventional and organic producers were
signiﬁcant at the .05 level. Household #19: ‘‘The amount of credit offered by Soppexcca
is very small. . .from ‘Atlantic’ [direct coffee exporter] I
receive US$10,000 and Soppexcca has not provided any.
Soppexcca also demands too much in terms of quality.’’
 Household #194: ‘‘Transport is very difﬁcult from our farm
to the road. The other buyer collects our coffee at the farm.’’
Physical capital
Capital for processing
Improvements in infrastructure at the household level played a
major role in Soppexcca’s strategy for improving coffee quality.
Physical capital for wet milling includes the construction/refur-
bishment of mill enclosures, construction/refurbishment of fer-
menting tanks, and the purchase/repair of machines for
depulping and pumping water. Table 6 provides clusterwise details
of household expenditures. The average investment by households
from the SDL cluster was US$198 during the period, skewed up-
wards by a few households; among the 72 households in the clus-
ter, only 12 reported cash investments for improved wet milling.
Investments by SSL, while signiﬁcantly higher than those of the
SDL cluster, remained low at US$593. Moreover, 70 SSL house-
holds, or nearly half the cluster, reported no cash investments dur-
ing the period. Investments by LSL households, at nearly three
times those of SSL households, showed considerably less variation
within the cluster. Credit by Soppexcca contributed roughly 48% of
the total reported household expenditure.
Capital for production
Households also reported their acquisition of machinery, tools,
and infrastructure for agricultural production in addition to those
used for wet milling. Notable is the extremely low investment by
households in the SDL cluster, at US$91 (Fig. 4). When investments
were made by SDL households, they were generally conﬁned to ba-
sic tools for production of coffee and basic grains (machetes, shov-
els, and sprayers). Similar to experiences in the building of physical
capital for wet milling, households in the SSL cluster achieved
higher investments than their SDL counterparts, but the absolute
level of investments was low. In general, ﬁndings suggest that
households from SDL and SSL clusters struggled to build their
physical capital endowments for farm production compared to
the level of productive investments made by LSL households. These
included relatively large purchases of machinery for the produc-
tion of coffee, investment in livestock, and generation of off-farm
business activities.
Financial capital
Access to credit
The ability of households to build natural and physical capital
was strongly related to their access to multiyear credit. BetweenFig. 4. Purchase of tools, equipment, and machinery, by cluster, average 2005–2006
to 2008–2009.
Table 5
Estimated income (US$) beneﬁt from coffee sales to Soppexcca, by cluster (average, 2007–2008 to 2008–2009).
Cluster Average total coffee
production (45 kg sack
green coffee)
Potential income if all
coffee sold to
Soppexccaa
Potential income beneﬁt
if all coffee sold to
Soppexccab
Actual income taking
into account sales to
other buyers
Income foregone
due to sales to other
buyers
% income beneﬁt
forgone due to sales to
other buyers
Conventional
SDL 5.9 643 71 611 32 45
SSL 18.0 1962 216 1875 87 41
LSL 100.2 10,922 1202 10,363 559 46
Total 31.3 3412 376 3251 161 43
Organic
SDL 6.6 898 257 821 77 30
SSL 9.5 1292 371 1198 94 26
LSL 49.4 6718 1927 6275 443 23
Total 14.0 1904 546 1758 146 27
a The following two-year average farm gate prices were offered by Soppexcca: US$109/45 kg sack for conventional coffee and US$136/45 kg sack for organic coffee.
b Difference in income generated from 100% of coffee production being sold to Soppexcca versus income generated from 100% of coffee being sold to other buyers. A two-
year average farm gate price of US$97/45 kg sack was used for estimating income from sales to other buyers.
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received credit for the purchase of land or expansion of coffee pro-
duction. SDL households (36%) were the least likely to have re-
ceived access to multiyear credit during the period, compared to
SSL households (65%) and LSL households (58%). The average
amount of credit was US$1271. Among the clusters, the average
amount varied from a low of US$889 for households in the LSL
cluster to a high of nearly US$1319 for households in the SSL clus-
ter. Among households in the SDL cluster, an average of US$957 in
credit was received, all of which Soppexcca provided.
As noted previously, many sampled households (57%) reported
no access to annual credit prior to joining Soppexcca. During the
assessment period, opportunities for obtaining annual credit in-
creased, in part due to linkages with Soppexcca, with only 12% of
sampled households reporting no access to annual credit. Among
the households that received annual credit, most (n = 160, 55%) re-
ported Soppexcca as their only source of credit. Other sources in-
cluded specialized lending organizations, coffee buyers, NGOs,
and, to a lesser extent, informal lenders and commercial banks.
Collateral requirements varied.
While the terms offered by Soppexcca were relatively favorable,
the average amount provided by Soppexcca was small. For exam-
ple, in 2007–2008, the mean credit value for SDL households was
US$197, US$390 for SSL households, and US$1805 for LSL house-
holds. Even for households with relatively small coffee holdings,
credit from Soppexcca was unlikely to cover variable production
costs, much less facilitate more strategic investments in asset
building. Moreover, few households were able to access credit con-
sistently: only 9.3%, 11.3%, and 25% of the SDL, SSL, and LSL house-
holds, respectively, were able to access annual credit for each year
of the assessment period. Between 20% and 55% of SDL households
ended the production year with debt to Soppexcca, with similar re-
sults recorded for SSL households.
Income beneﬁt from coffee sales to Soppexcca
Findings about beneﬁts of coffee sales through Soppexcca are
illuminating. As noted above, it is not uncommon for smallholders
to divert sales from formal to informal channels. Table 5 presents
estimates of the income beneﬁt for Soppexcca members from cof-
fee sales, taking into account sales to Soppexcca and to other buy-
ers and allowing for the differences in farm-gate prices between
coffee buyers. Among households from SDL and SSL clusters that
produced conventional coffee, the actual income beneﬁts from par-
ticipation in Soppexcca were small, at US$32 and US$87, respec-
tively. These income estimates reﬂect that 41%-45% of the
potential income beneﬁt from the sale of fair trade coffee was lost
due to the selling of coffee to other buyers. Certiﬁed-organichouseholds from the SDL and SSL clusters experienced higher in-
come beneﬁts than their conventional counterparts, at US$77 and
US$94, respectively. However, these households also struggled to
maximize their income beneﬁts from participation in formal mar-
kets. On average, 27% of the total potential income beneﬁt from the
sale of fair trade organic coffee was lost due to the selling of coffee
to other buyers. For producers of conventional coffee, the small
size of the price beneﬁt generated through sale of coffee to Sop-
pexcca may have facilitated their decision to sell to other buyers.
For both types of producers, the strong need to sell coffee outside
of Soppexcca often reﬂected farmers’ urgent needs for annual cred-
it linked to coffee production, for the ability to respond to shocks,
and to smooth income generation over the year.
Discussion
For poor smallholder coffee growers, research has highlighted
both the potential and the limitations of asset building by coffee
growers in Nicaragua in response to more intensive value chain
interactions and development interventions. Our discussion begins
with a look at the overall changes in asset endowments and then
examines the differences in asset building based on cluster
afﬁliation.
Many households built up key elements of natural capital,
including expanded areas under coffee production and renovated
coffee trees. These investments helped to overcome the erosion
of natural capital that took place during the coffee crisis. For house-
holds that depend on coffee production for most of their income,
these investments are likely to have positive future impacts on rur-
al livelihoods. Access to credit with extended repayment periods
played a critical role in expanding and improving natural capital.
On the other hand, lack of progress in addressing other dimensions
of natural capital, such as nutrient mining due to lack of affordable
fertilizers and insecure land tenure, are likely to diminish hopes
that poor households will improve their coffee productivity in
the future.
A similar pattern of signiﬁcant, but incomplete, asset building
was detected for the other capitals. In terms of human capital, evi-
dence suggests that most households acquired new skills that im-
proved coffee quality, but few households had acquired the more
complex skills for improved plantation management – a critical
determinant of coffee productivity and disease resistance. The abil-
ity to implement more intensive production practices was also
linked to endowments of human and ﬁnancial capitals, which were
also severely constrained in many cases.
Results suggest that there were limited impacts to build
human capital through cooperative-provided technical assistance.
Table 6
Differences in asset building in response to new links to certiﬁed coffee markets (N/A – not applicable).
Cluster Social capital Natural capital Human capital Physical capital Financial capital
Small-scale diversiﬁed livelihoods (SDL)
Evidence of considerable asset building N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Evidence of low to moderate level of asset
building
New links to Soppexcca – a trusted
buyer of coffee and provider of
marketing, technical assistance, and
credit services
Generally able to expand area
under coffee production and
renovate existing plantations
through Soppexcca credit
N/A N/A Limited income beneﬁts from
certiﬁed coffee
Evidence of little/no evidence of asset
building
Lack of complementary assets implied
that households struggled to beneﬁt
signiﬁcantly from new links; links
maintained with local coffee buyers
Major limitations for improving
soil fertility
Least likely to have upgraded
knowledge and skills for improving
coffee quality; few able to modernize
plantation management practices
Least able to reinvest gains from
higher coffee prices or improved
credit access into the accumulation
of physical for on-farm production
Least likely to have access to
multiyear credit; access to
annual credit limited due to
low productivity
Small-scale specialized livelihoods (SSL)
Evidence of considerable asset building Links to Soppexcca provided ﬁrst-time
access to credit, technical assistance
and other services; greater capacity to
leverage Soppexcca access for building
of other assets (e.g., natural capital)
N/A N/A Major gains in machinery and
infrastructure for wet milling,
often with assistance from
Soppexcca credit
N/A
Evidence of low to moderate level of asset
building
Links maintained with local coffee
buyers, due to stronger pre-existing
links and inability to fully take
advantage of Soppexcca access
Possibility to expand area under
coffee production, renovate
existing coffee plantations, and
expand total agricultural area,
often with Soppexcca-provided
credit
Likely to have upgraded knowledge
and skills for improving coffee
quality
Limited investments on other
tools, equipment and machinery
for on-farm production
Limited income beneﬁts from
certiﬁed coffee limited; most
households with new access
multiyear credit; limited
amount of annual credit
accessible
Evidence of little/no evidence of asset
building
N/A Major limitations for improving
soil fertility
Difﬁculty to modernize plantation
management through access to
technical assistance
N/A N/A
Large-scale specialized livelihoods (LSL)
Evidence of considerable asset building N/A N/A Generally able to upgrade their
knowledge and skills for coffee
production; effective access to
complementary assets (social and
ﬁnancial capitals) for modernizing
production system
Signiﬁcant increase in physical
capital through higher coffee
prices and long-term credit;
average investments for wet
milling exceeded those of SSL
households by twofold
Some income beneﬁts from
certiﬁed coffee; access to
multiyear and annual credit
was favorable
Evidence of low to moderate level of asset
building
Pre-existing endowments were
relatively high, with strong links to
local intermediaries and direct
exporters of coffee; Soppexcca offered
an additional source of credit
Relatively large pre-existing
areas of agricultural production;
area under coffee production
increased, on average
N/A N/A N/A
Evidence of little/no evidence of asset
building
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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J. Donovan, N. Poole / Food Policy 44 (2014) 1–13 11Soppexcca had no monitoring system in place nor had it attempted
to link technical assistance with its other services (e.g., credit) or
external services (e.g., specialized providers of business develop-
ment and technical services). Donors, projects, and NGOs that ﬁ-
nanced technical assistance by Soppexcca were reluctant to insist
on accountability or engage Soppexcca in identifying outcome-
enhancing measures.
Results also draw attention to challenges faced by Soppexcca’s
volunteer leadership to effectively participate in Soppexcca’s gov-
ernance. Volunteer leaders lacked basic business skills prior to
assuming their posts, as well as access to critical information on
business performance. They indicated apprehension about con-
fronting authority, and conﬂicts emerged among members when
professional managers were questioned. Reluctance to challenge
the management was likely enhanced by the failure of Soppexcca’s
predecessor cooperative, juxtaposed with its success in expanding
sales of certiﬁed coffee and securing support from NGOs and pro-
jects.3 Results here support previous ﬁndings on the autocratic nat-
ure of cooperative governance in Nicaragua and the distant
engagement of NGOs in the development process (Kroeker, 1996).
Links to Soppexcca and markets for certiﬁed coffee resulted in
an important increase in social capital for households. Soppexcca
offered some protection from the recurrent economic, social, and
environmental uncertainties that characterize coffee production
in Nicaragua. Technical assistance and credit allowed households
to rebuild assets that were eroded during the coffee crisis. For
many households, Soppexcca offered the ﬁrst opportunity to access
credit and technical assistance since they initiated coffee produc-
tion. Despite the importance of links to Soppexcca, most house-
holds diverted considerable quantities of coffee to local
intermediaries or direct exporters. Mujawamariya et al. (2013)
suggest that smallholders’ decisions to deal with buyers outside
the cooperative likely responds to their trust relations within local
buyers based on repeated transactions in credit. Evidence from
Soppexcca supports this argument. The use of credit for meeting
consumption needs, combined with the relatively high costs of
selling to Soppexcca (e.g., high quality demands, delayed payment,
and transport to warehouse) also encouraged side selling by Sop-
pexcca members. Households managed a portfolio of buyer rela-
tionships in such a way as to optimize the relationship between
product prices and production, access to credit and transaction
costs of and sales.
In general, households struggled to build physical capital for
agricultural production, in general, and coffee production, in par-
ticular. The general expansion of wet-milling infrastructure and
equipment was one element of physical capital where considerable
investments were detected. Multiyear credit by Soppexcca facili-
tated these investments. The credit was provided to Soppexcca
by NGOs looking to support the cooperative in its efforts to en-
hanced coffee quality and reduce water consumption and contam-
ination in the processing of coffee cherries.
The income beneﬁts from access to certiﬁed-coffee markets
were generally limited during the period under assessment,
reﬂecting the high prices of conventional coffee relative to those
for certiﬁed coffee. At the time of data collection (2009–2010),
international commodity prices for coffee were higher than at
any period in the past 20 years. However, boom and bust are recur-
rent features of coffee markets, suggesting that a future analysis of3 During the coffee crisis, Soppexcca used half of the social premium from fair-
trade coffee sales to pay down the debt with coffee buyers. In 2009, the decision was
made to apply half the social premium to pay down the new debt acquired in the
purchase of the processing plant. Both uses of the premium can be justiﬁed from a
business perspective; however, concerns arise as to whether an empowered board of
directors would have invested the premium in the same matter, especially after
having paid off the initial debt to buyers.income beneﬁts from another crisis would present strikingly dif-
ferent ﬁndings. Indeed, Soppexcca’s initial growth occurred before
the period of this study when the price premium for certiﬁed coffee
was very attractive to smallholders struggling with the aftermath
of the coffee crisis. Despite relatively small income beneﬁts,
engagement with the cooperative was important for other reasons:
access to credit facilitated coffee production and provided a form of
insurance against shocks such as illness, death, and crop failures,
which otherwise would have resulted in asset erosion. While many
households received credit for coffee production for the ﬁrst time
through Soppexcca, access to credit was often inconsistent and
the amount of credit was insufﬁcient to intensify coffee production
or make longer-term strategic investments in asset building.
This study offers a cautious but positive view on the potential of
poor smallholders to improve livelihood security through links to
cooperatives and higher value coffee markets. Feasibility con-
straints limited the chosen set of indicators of livelihoods assets,
but the most signiﬁcant changes have been captured. Improve-
ments in natural, social, and ﬁnancial capital ensured that house-
holds had the minimum endowments needed to participate in
the Soppexcca value chain. Access to Soppexcca offered safety nets,
lower marketing risks, and access to inputs, which have important
positive implications for livelihood maintenance and security. On
the other hand, there was little evidence that interventions by
the cooperative and its NGO and donor partners allowed house-
holds to intensify production or to generate new products and ser-
vices outside of the coffee value chain. The extent to which
potentially greater gains in livelihood security could have been
achieved through physical capital expansion aimed at increased
efﬁciency and productivity of other crops, such as bananas, beans,
and corn, remains to be explored by Soppexcca and its external
partners. Thus complex business skills remained undeveloped. This
may be explained by the incomplete nature of asset building dur-
ing the assessment period, the overall weak household asset
endowments prior to the assessment period, and the time it takes
to develop individual human and collective social capital.Heterogeneity in asset building
Signiﬁcant variation due to pre-existing endowments was evi-
dent in the ability of households to build assets. Table 6 summa-
rizes and compares asset building between the three clusters. In
general, SDL households were the least likely to have achieved ma-
jor advances in asset building. This was especially true in terms of
human, physical, and ﬁnancial capitals. SDL households beneﬁted
from certiﬁed-coffee markets mainly through access to Soppexcca
safety nets and reduced vulnerability to external shocks. The expe-
riences of SDL households that seem to fall below a responsiveness
threshold showed that rural poverty goals might best be achieved
by helping those households with the smallest asset endowments
to transition out of agriculture. SSL households experienced alto-
gether greater gains in asset building and the gains were more
evenly spread across the different types of capitals. Nevertheless,
the better-endowed LSL households were the primary beneﬁciaries
in terms of ﬁnancial capital and most of the other areas of asset
building.Conclusions
This study applies a livelihoods asset framework to understand
smallholder assets building in response to new links with a coffee
cooperative that enabled participation in high-value certiﬁed-cof-
fee markets. Embedded in these links were a set of interactions,
interventions, and processes that shaped how smallholders partic-
ipate in the value chain. This use of a livelihoods asset framework
12 J. Donovan, N. Poole / Food Policy 44 (2014) 1–13marks a conceptual and methodological contribution to the litera-
ture through its exploration of how households are able beneﬁt
from new links to markets, the differences in household participa-
tion based on variations in livelihood strategies and initial asset
endowments, and the role of cooperatives and development inter-
ventions in creating important linkages between producers and
international markets.
How did initial asset endowments and subsequent household
changes determine smallholders’ participation in high-value ex-
port markets? In short, did the access to certiﬁed-coffee markets
help the poorest? The analysis presented here suggests that the
institutions, interventions, and processes related to participation
in certiﬁed-coffee markets did achieve a broader set of outcomes
than merely accessing favorable prices, including building a sus-
tainable and more competitive value chain, the building of more
viable cooperatives, and building of speciﬁc assets by some of the
poorest farming households. It was shown that all of these out-
comes were important to creating a viable coffee value chain pro-
viding some livelihood improvements and even a pathway out of
poverty for many of the households linked to it.
However, even a cursory examination of Table 6 shows that
those with better initial asset endowments (i.e., the LSL house-
holds) gained the most from the interventions and new opportuni-
ties accessed through Soppexcca. This conclusion, together with
the evidence that the least well-endowed experienced the least as-
set building in absolute terms, suggests that a multiple threshold
concept of asset endowments is likely to operate: that is to say,
there are likely to be multiple thresholds, such as an upper thresh-
old above which the better-off producers beneﬁt little, an interme-
diate threshold above which producers can take advantage of the
opportunities, and possibly a lower threshold below which the
poorest may experience asset depletion resulting from develop-
ment interventions that increase risk and vulnerability (Donovan
and Poole, 2013). The Soppexcca experience also shows that
achievements do not come cheaply or quickly; they result from
years of investments by coffee buyers, donors, and civil society,
Soppexcca, and cooperative members.
Conclusions on economic and environmental sustainability are
tentative, because sustainability was not the focus of the study
and changes will only be demonstrated over the long term.
This study – even using a reduced set of livelihood asset indi-
cators – highlights the challenges and dilemmas for poverty-
reduction policies based on more intensive links to higher-value
markets. It suggests a development strategy that recognizes the
complexities and trade-offs among asset types that are by no
means discrete, but often are complementary and sometimes
antagonistic. The study highlights the important role that
cooperatives play in building the capacities of the poor to partic-
ipate in higher-value markets. It also suggests that cooperatives
will beneﬁt from greater attention to the consolidation of their
internal governance mechanisms, as well as support in the design,
implementation, and monitoring of cooperative-provided ser-
vices. Finding viable solutions to the complex problems facing
cooperatives and their members will require deeper engagement
with stakeholders, including NGOs, buyers, and government
agencies.
There are additional lessons: ﬁrst, the notion of asset comple-
mentarities. For example, a clear conception of ﬁnancial capital is
important. Financial capital is more than income or credit
arrangements. Working ﬁnancial capital underpins investment in
other livelihood assets, particularly natural and physical, such as
fertilizer (for maintaining natural capital) and agricultural equip-
ment and rooﬁng (for physical capital). It is also an important
entitlement mechanism to meet general household expenses and
other human capital-building pathways such as educational
expenses for children. Thus ﬁnancial capital has two importantcharacteristics: it is a means to an end rather than an end in itself;
and it is fungible: actually it is a means to various ends. But while
the provision of credit is of primary importance, it is not a panacea.
Other complementarities exist: contextual or idiosyncratic
household constraints affect the capacity of smallholders to take
advantage of new opportunities, for example, labor constraints
that inhibit physical expansion of farms as well as the adoption
of improved management practices. Investments involve strategic
choices and often signiﬁcant trade-offs between diverse livelihood
activities, as well as risk of asset depletion: livelihood losses. For
broader social objectives, interventions required will be more com-
plex and involve a range of services that take into account asset
trade-offs, particularly among the poorest. Heterogeneity and com-
plexity thus make intervention targeting a serious ethical
necessity.
Second, because of complementarities and trade-offs, projects
and interventions must not merely address the weakest links in
the chain, through interventions directly targeting speciﬁc weak-
nesses such as the provision of ﬁnance or of technical assistance.
Programmes and policies must reﬂect a more holistic approach
to value chain enhancement, speciﬁcally addressing the underlying
constraints and capacities of smallholders: land tenure, credit col-
lateral, small scale, labor constraints, technological change, princi-
ples and practice of cooperative action, and enhancement of
business skills, all within a framework of environmental, social,
and economic sustainability.References
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